Case

Eight multinationals in disputes with Latin American governments, 2001–2012

Includes a cement producer, utilities and telecoms, and one oil major. Illustrates the obsolescing bargain, proximal versus mediated embedding, creeping expropriation and the liability of insidership.

Industry
Energy, utilities, telecoms, construction materials
Frameworks applied
The obsolescing bargain between MNE and host stateProximal versus mediated embedding
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Frameworks applied

This case is read through the frameworks below.

  • The obsolescing bargain between MNE and host stateWhen a multinational's board plans a plant or mine abroad, how will its bargaining power with the host government weaken once those fixed assets are sunk?
  • Proximal versus mediated embeddingWhen a host government turns hostile, should a multinational's leadership engage local non-market stakeholders directly or through intermediaries, so it spots and answers the threat in time?

Sources

References

Listed A–Z by author surname, Harvard style. A source with a DOI links to https://doi.org/…; one without links to its page or says plainly that it has no DOI.

  1. Moschieri, C., Ravasi, D. and Huy, Q. (2024) ‘Why do some multinational firms respond better than others to the hostility of host governments? Proximal embedding and the side effects of local partnerships’, Journal of Management Studies, 61(2), pp. 627–685.doi:10.1111/joms.12809Source page