Framework
Institutionalist approach to AI governance
The question it answers
When setting rules for its AI products, should an AI firm's leadership write its own standards or back binding public law that covers the whole sector?
- Origin
- Ferretti, 2022; Ferretti, 2024
- Diagram type
- Hub diagram
- Level of analysis
- Industry

Diagram
Institutionalist approach to AI governance
Public regulation over self-regulation
Legitimacy: democratic process confers authority
Stability: binding law covers the whole sector; markets weaken self-regulation
Efficiency: central coordination, redistributing impacts
Exception: when government fails, firms' political duties widen
AI exposes existing institutional vulnerabilities
Sources
References
Listed A–Z by author surname, Harvard style. A source with a DOI links to https://doi.org/…; one without links to its page or says plainly that it has no DOI.
- Ferretti, T. (2022) ‘An institutionalist approach to AI ethics: justifying the priority of government regulation over self-regulation’, Moral Philosophy and Politics, 9(2), pp. 239–265.doi:10.1515/mopp-2020-0056Source page
- Ferretti, T. (2024) ‘Value alignment without institutional change cannot prevent the societal risks of artificial intelligence’, LSE Public Policy Review, 3(3), article 2.doi:10.31389/lseppr.113Source page